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ANOTHER LOOK AT SKELLY OIL AND FRANCHISE TAX
BOARD
Paul E. Salamanca*
In recent years, members of the Supreme Court of the United
States have twice cited Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.1 for
the proposition that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,2 which
Congress enacted in 1934, is “procedural only” and does not enlarge
the scope of federal jurisdiction.3 By this, they probably mean that
Skelly allows no case into federal court in the presence of the act that
could not find its way there in its absence.4 But whether this
assertion is accurate today, or was accurate in 1950 when Justice
Frankfurter wrote Skelly, is not entirely clear. Depending on how
one reads Skelly and how one defines “enlargement,” the act as
currently interpreted may in fact “enlarge” the scope of federal
jurisdiction, and it may even have done so under Skelly. In
particular, Skelly may construe the act to allow certain cases to be
heard in federal court earlier than they might otherwise have been
* Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I
appreciate the help of Richard Ausness, Scott Bauries, Mary Davis, Chris Frost, Brian Frye, Jeff
Kaplan, Mark Kightlinger, Kathy Moore, Bob Schwemm, Beau Steenken, and Stephen Wilson
in writing this article.
1 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (2012).
3 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014) (“We
agree with amicus that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not ‘extend’ the ‘jurisdiction’ of the
federal courts.” (quoting Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671)); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 77–79
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To the extent § 4 [of the
Arbitration Act] brings some issues into federal court in a particular case that may not be
brought in through other procedural mechanisms, it does so by ‘enlarg[ing] the range of
remedies available in the federal courts[,] . . . not extend[ing] their jurisdiction.’” (quoting
Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671)) (comparing the Declaratory Judgment Act to the Arbitration Act); see
also Robin E. Dieckmann, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Suits—
Federal Preemption of State Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 128 (“Although the FDJA
did create a new federal remedy, it did not enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts.”). Skelly actually took its description of the act as “procedural only” from an earlier
case. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (“The word ‘actual’ is one of
emphasis rather than of definition. Thus the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is
procedural only.”).
4 Roughly speaking, that is. If a party could only seek declaratory relief if he or she could
also seek coercive (i.e., non-declaratory) relief, then the act would be superfluous. See infra note
49 and accompanying text.
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heard, and at the instance of the party that may otherwise have been
the defendant in a conventional action for coercive (i.e., nondeclaratory) relief.5 This may constitute a form of jurisdictional
“enlargement,” depending on how one defines the term. Given
Skelly’s status as an icon of federal jurisdiction, issues such as this
merit attention. In particular, we should ask ourselves what Justice
Frankfurter meant by Skelly, if the Court pays homage to Skelly in
the breach, and what, if anything, is left of the case.6
Nor would any discussion of Skelly be complete without attention
to its adoptive child, Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust. Again, depending on how one reads Skelly, Franchise
Tax Board represents either a vindication or a partial repudiation of
the earlier case’s approach. If only because Franchise Tax Board has
confounded a generation of lawyers,7 it too merits attention. More to
the point, we should ask ourselves if the case yields a rule that can
be applied to other cases. I conclude that it does, although stating
5 See generally Daniel Engelstein, Note, Removal—State Declaratory Actions Based on
Federal Question Jurisdiction—La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 17 B.C. L. REV. 72, 81
(1975) (“Although the Skelly-Wycoff rule has been utilized to deny original jurisdiction in those
cases where the declaratory complaint raises what would have been a federal defense to a state
claim, jurisdiction has been allowed in declaratory actions based on a defense to what would
have been a federal coercive action in the conventional procedural posture.”). For further
discussion of Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., see footnote number fifteen below. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); see infra note 15. In point of fact, many forms
of ostensibly “coercive” relief are virtually identical to declaratory judgments. Consider, for
example, an “injunction” that resolves whether a trust has a duty under federal law not to
submit to a levy for unpaid taxes from an agency of a state. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1983). Apart from the threat of contempt for
non-compliance, such an injunction would not differ materially from a declaration to the same
effect. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Declaratory Judgment as a Quasi-Injunction, LIBR. L. &
LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/03/25/declaratory-judgment-as-aquasi-injunction/. In addition, such a declaration, if unheeded, could often be converted into an
injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (“[Authorizing f]urther necessary or proper relief . . . against
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by . . . [a federal declaratory] judgment.”).
See also discussion infra Part II (providing a full and detailed treatment of Franchise Tax
Board).
6 Skelly has received a fair amount of scholarly attention, much of it critical. See, e.g., Donald
L. Doernberg, “You Can Lead a Horse to Water . . .”: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow the
Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1009–
10, 1012–13 (1990) [hereinafter Doernberg, You Can Lead a Horse to Water]; Donald L.
Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean Griswold Offers New Evidence
About the Jurisdictional Debate Surrounding the Enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
37 UCLA L. REV. 139, 140 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg & Mushlin, History Comes Calling];
Martha A. Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum
Shopping, and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 611, 625 (2013); John B.
Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise
Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1835–36 (1998).
7 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Twenty Questions (Or the Hardest Course in Law School), 18 GA.
ST. U. L. REV . 497, 502–03 (2001) (“[W]hy are there virtually no law review articles on Franchise
Tax Board?”). Perhaps this article will respond to this question.
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the rule is about as awkward as making a three-point turn in a
Winnebago. To wit, Franchise Tax Board stands for the proposition
that, if and only if a state (or one of its instrumentalities) brings an
action for declaratory relief under its own laws, in its own courts, and
the party against whom it seeks such relief is sitting on (i.e., declining
to bring) a coercive action that arises under the laws of the United
States, that party may not remove the case to federal court.8
In the first part of this article, I will discuss Skelly and assess its
current vitality,9 with particular reference to so-called “mirrorimage” cases, a complex category that includes Franchise Tax Board
as an example.10 In the second part, I will take up Franchise Tax
Board.11 In the final part, I will offer a conclusion.
I. SKELLY REDUX
Close analysis reveals that Skelly is very much alive, although
perhaps not quite as much so as the Justices’ references suggest.12 In
fact, Skelly still performs most, if not all, of the work Justice
Frankfurter might have expected.13 Most significantly, it continues
to exclude from federal court so-called “federal-defense” and “federalreply” cases.14 In these cases, a party seeking a declaration from a
federal court has a distinct action under state law for coercive relief
that anticipates a federal response, but the complaint for which,
properly pleaded, lacks a federal component.15 In other words, Skelly
8 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21–22; see also infra note 107 and accompanying text
(providing an elaboration and example on this point). Presumably few parties would want to
initiate such litigation in federal court, although such an action is not unheard of. See, e.g.,
Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 454 (1894) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that a state, anticipating a federal defense, brought a state claim against a bank
in federal court).
9 See infra Part I.
10 See infra note 17 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of Skelly in relation to
mirror-image cases).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See, e.g., San Diego Cty. Office of Educ. v. Pollock, No. 13-CV-1647-BEN (BLM), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 111113, at *7–9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (showing that Skelly is still cited as proof
that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not in fact increase federal jurisdiction).
13 See, e.g., id.
14 See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme
Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 532, 548 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg & Mushlin,
Trojan Horse].
15 See id. at 548. The category of “federal-defense” cases, as used in this article, should not
be confused with the category of cases in which a party, anticipating an adverse action by state
officials (and therefore functionally a defendant), asks a federal court for declaratory or
injunctive relief on the ground that such an action would violate federal law. In such cases,
the plaintiff (i.e., the functional defendant) asserts an anticipatory federal defense to a public
cause of action, and arguably has nothing but a derivative cause of action of his or her own. At
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continues to exclude from federal court declaratory actions in which
the plaintiff has a claim for coercive relief that would fail the wellpleaded complaint rule, even if a federal issue were certain to present
itself later in the case.16
On the other side of the ledger, however, Skelly (as currently
deployed) does not exclude from federal court the vast majority of
mirror-image cases.17 In these cases, a party seeking declaratory
relief from a federal court lacks an action for coercive relief that
satisfies the well-pleaded complaint rule, but the party against whom
the declaration is sought has an action for coercive relief that does
satisfy the rule.18 Depending on how one reads Skelly, this nearly
universal access either departs from or is consistent with Justice
Frankfurter’s vision.19 But here one finds a wrinkle. Although
federal courts now entertain almost all such actions, there are some
situations where they will not, as is exemplified by Franchise Tax
Board.20 Again, depending on how one reads Skelly, Franchise Tax
least in theory, federal courts have long been willing to hear such cases. See, e.g., Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (declaratory relief); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148–49
(1908) (injunctive relief). To be sure, the Court has been somewhat uneven in allowing
declaratory attacks where the ostensible plaintiff (functional defendant) seeks to establish that
a particular state law is preempted by federal law. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344
U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (citations omitted) (suggesting in dictum that parties with a federal
defense of preemption should wait to assert that defense in an adverse proceeding in state
court); see generally Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 160–61 (criticizing Wycoff). Precedent now
suggests that federal courts will hear such actions, provided the plaintiff presents a ripe case.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). In any case, “federal-defense”
cases, as the term is used in this article, are instances where the would-be federal plaintiff has
a distinct cause of action under state law, a federal defense to which it anticipates from the
putative defendant. See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548. Various
commentators have combined the category of cases I am describing as “federal-defense” cases
with the category for which Young is the exemplar. See, e.g., id., at 571 n.192. For purposes of
this article, I am reserving the term for cases in which the party seeking declaratory relief has
a distinct (i.e., non-derivative) cause of action of his or her own arising under state law.
16 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1950).
A classic
example of such a case would be one in which a plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of contract,
knowing that the defendant intended to assert an affirmative defense on the basis of federal
law, and knowing as well that the result in the case would depend entirely on the validity of
that federal defense. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151–53
(1908). The well-pleaded complaint rule would exclude the action for breach from federal court,
at least where the plaintiff sought damages, and Skelly would exclude from federal court a case
arising from the same set of operative facts if the plaintiff stated a claim for declaratory relief.
See, e.g., id. at 152; see also Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 531 n.9. One
wrinkle, of course, is that the Mottleys may actually have sought equitable relief, the proper
pleading for which might well have required a description of the railroad company’s federal
defenses. See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the
Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1517 (1989); infra note 41 and accompanying text.
17 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 532, 548.
18 See id. at 532, 548.
19 See id. at 571 n.190.
20 See discussion infra Part II.
Exactly what general principle one might derive from
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Board either reflects or defies the earlier case.
In its essence, Skelly was about a commodities future. Phillips
Petroleum Co. (“Phillips”), acting as a broker, wanted to compel the
Skelly Oil Company (“Skelly”) to adhere to a contract for the sale of
natural gas.21 Skelly, meanwhile, thought it had validly terminated
the agreement.22 Phillips sued Skelly in federal court for a
declaration that the contract remained enforceable.23 Because they
were not diverse, jurisdiction required a federal question.24 Phillips
thought it could satisfy this requirement by explaining in its
complaint for declaratory relief that the only real issue in the case
was the validity of Skelly’s purported termination,25 which in turn
depended on whether the Federal Power Commission (“Commission”)
had granted a third party—the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line
Company
(“Michigan-Wisconsin”)—a
certificate
of
public
convenience and necessity on or before December 1, 1946,26 (the idea
being that Skelly and others would sell natural gas to Phillips, which
would then sell the gas to Michigan-Wisconsin).27
Under the contract, Skelly could terminate if Michigan-Wisconsin
did not obtain its certificate by the specified date.28 Skelly
maintained this had happened; Phillips said it had not.29 (In fact, the
Commission had granted a certificate, but subject to conditions.)30
Describing this dispute in its request for declaratory relief, and
classifying the completeness and timeliness of the certificate as
federal issues, Phillips argued that it satisfied the requirement that
a federal issue appear on the face of its well-pleaded complaint.31
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter refused to allow Phillips
to proceed on this basis.32 By his lights, federal courts could not hear
a case simply because a federal issue appeared on the face of a wellpleaded complaint for declaratory relief.33 Presumably, this was
because any competent request for a declaration must anticipate the
Franchise Tax Board is itself a perplexing question. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
21 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 669.
22 See id. at 670.
23 See id. at 670–71.
24 See id. at 671.
25 See id. at 670–71.
26 See id. at 669. The Federal Power Commission is the predecessor of today’s Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a) (2012).
27 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 669.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 670–71.
30 See id. at 669–70.
31 See id. at 670–71.
32 See id. at 669, 672 (citation omitted).
33 See id. at 671–72.
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other side’s arguments, such that the existence of a live dispute is
clear.34 If this were permitted, the well-pleaded complaint rule would
become a nullity, because any party whose complaint for coercive
relief would lack a federal issue could simply ask for declaratory relief
as well, thus circumventing the rule.35
Unwilling to tolerate such a development, Justice Frankfurter
concluded that, when federal judges receive requests for declaratory
relief, they should ignore the words of the actual request and instead
hypothesize an action for coercive relief that underlies, or comes close
to underlying, the ostensible action.36 If this hypothesized claim
would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal court may
hear the case.37 If not, the federal court must dismiss the action and
the plaintiff must go to state court.38 Applying this approach to the
case at hand, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Phillips’ action
could not proceed in federal court.39 The hypothetical coercive action
that most nearly underlay Phillips’ action for declaratory relief was
an action for anticipatory repudiation of contract, the complaint for
which, he concluded, would not have included a federal issue.40 Such
an issue, he wrote, would have appeared only in Skelly’s answer,
where it would assert valid termination as an affirmative defense, on

34 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937) (“The Declaratory
Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard
to the [Constitution] . . . and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the
constitutional sense.” (citation omitted)). So much is required both by the text of the statute as
well as by the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (“In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” (emphasis added)).
35 See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 D UKE
L.J. 1091, 1121 (2014) [hereinafter Bray, Myth] (“[O]ne could see every decision by a court,
including every decision paired with an injunction, as containing something like an implicit
declaratory judgment about how the law applies to specific facts.”). Thus, a party with an action
for coercive relief that does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, but that does anticipate
a federal defense or reply, could simply ask for a federal declaration and append a claim for
coercive relief as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a).
36 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544.
37 See id. Under current doctrine, the presence of a federal issue on the face of the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint for coercive relief is necessary for a federal court to hear the case under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and related statutes, but it is not sufficient. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005). The issue must also be
substantial enough (from a federal perspective) to merit the attention of a federal court, and
allocating it to such a tribunal must not overly disrupt the federalist scheme. See, e.g., id.;
infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (providing an elaboration on this point). Justice
Frankfurter did not address these issues in Skelly.
38 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544.
39 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 674 (1950).
40 See id. at 672.
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the ground that the certificate had been incomplete or untimely.41
Skelly’s possession of a federal defense to Phillips’ claim for breach,
or Phillips’ possession of a federal reply to Skelly’s defense, was not
sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction.42 Justice Frankfurter thus
construed the act to exclude federal-defense and federal-reply cases.43
41 See id. (“Whatever federal claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be
injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by petitioners.”). Justice
Frankfurter may have been a bit hasty in reaching this conclusion. An action for anticipatory
repudiation can be one for damages, or it can be one for specific relief—an order that the
defendant adhere to the terms of the contract, even if performance is not immediately
contemplated. Phillips’ hypothetical action at law would have lacked a federal issue, just as
Justice Frankfurter indicated, but its hypothetical action for specific relief in fact may have
satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule. This is because the invalidity of a federal defense to
an action in equity may well have been accepted by the federal courts in 1950 as a valid part of
the plaintiff’s case-in-chief—perhaps as a function of having to show lack of an adequate remedy
at law. See Field, supra note 6, at 623; John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 S TAN . L. REV. 989,
1016 (2008) (“There was no Skelly Oil principle for injunctive suits that anticipated actions at
law and reversed the parties to them: the pleading to which the well-pleaded complaint rule
applied was the bill in equity, not the complaint in the corresponding action at law.”); Alfred
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM . L. REV . 1109, 1129 (1969) (“To give adequate reasons
for the intervention of equity, the petitioner had to tell the entire story.”); but cf. Collins, supra
note 16, at 1517 (“Some of the best examples of the well-pleaded complaint rule, including
Mottley itself, were equity cases in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to jump the gun and
raise a constitutional challenge to an anticipated statutory defense.”). If Justice Frankfurter
entertained the possibility that Phillips’ ostensible action in equity might have satisfied the
well-pleaded complaint rule, he must have dismissed it sub silentio. If so, the approach he
ordained in Skelly toward actions for declaratory relief would have applied as well to actions in
equity—a decision that would have had nothing to do with Congress’ intent in enacting the
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.
42 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672, 674.
43 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548. Ironically, in his effort to
limit the jurisdictional impact of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Justice Frankfurter may have
overlooked the possibility—even the likelihood—that there was no federal issue at all in Skelly,
either in the pleadings or in potential pleadings. See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 679–80 (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting in part). This is because Phillips and Skelly—not the United States—had decided
to make absence of a timely, complete certificate grounds for termination of the contract, and
what the parties meant by these concepts was not itself a federal issue. See id. at 669 (majority
opinion). For a rough equivalent, imagine a bet between two parties about whether a particular
federal regulation, when issued, would be “vague” or “opaque.” Such a dispute would not
present a federal issue, even though the regulation would be the focus of the bet. In a manner
of speaking, the regulation would merely provide a “fact.” The Commission had granted
Michigan-Wisconsin a certificate subject to several conditions (conditions which, by the way,
strike the bystander as fairly predictable, and therefore unlikely to have blind-sided anyone).
See id. at 669–70, 679 n.3. Michigan-Wisconsin had to obtain regulatory approval from the
various jurisdictions in which it would operate, it had to obtain approval from the Securities
and Exchange Commission for its financing, and finally, its certificate was subject to a carveout for an incumbent utility in Greater Detroit, the scope of which the Commission would set
forth in a subsequent order. See id. at 669–70. Whether imposition of these conditions justified
Skelly’s termination was entirely a matter of interpreting the contract between the parties and
had little if anything to do with federal law itself. Thus, the Court could fairly easily have
dismissed the case for presenting no federal question, either latent or patent. See id. at 679–
80 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting in part). Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice Burton, seem to
have agreed, as did Professors Cohen and Mishkin. See id.; William Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
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The application of Skelly to mirror-image cases is more complex,
however, because Justice Frankfurter never addressed the possibility
that Skelly—the party against whom Phillips sought declaratory
relief—might have had an action for coercive relief under federal law,
or that the existence of such an action might have allowed Phillips to
proceed.44 There are two possible explanations for this. First, Justice
Frankfurter might have assumed that Skelly did not have a coercive
action against Phillips under federal law, thus eliminating the need
to reach the issue. If Skelly had a cause of action against Phillips, it
would have been one for a judgment of non-liability on a contract.45
Although such an action is plausible and in fact well-known in the
area of insurance, it bears all the characteristics of an action for
declaratory, not coercive, relief.46 Second, Justice Frankfurter might
have considered Skelly’s putative action for coercive relief beside the
point. In other words, he might have squarely rejected the idea that
the Declaratory Judgment Act would allow a mirror-image case into
federal court.47
Given Justice Frankfurter’s general distrust of courts, particularly
federal courts,48 it would not be unreasonable to assume that he
890, 911 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 C OLUM . L.
REV. 157, 183–84 (1953). In fact, Justice Frankfurter himself may have recognized this in his
handling of the accompanying action in diversity between Phillips and Magnolia Petroleum
Company, with respect to which there was no jurisdictional problem. See Skelly, 339 U.S. at
678 (“Parties do not necessarily endow statutory language in a contract with the scope of the
statute, particularly when the same term may have variant meanings for different applications
of the statute.” (citation omitted)). Justice Frankfurter even wrote a private “caveat” on Skelly
in which he acknowledged (at least to himself) that the proper construction of the ostensibly
“statutory” terms in the contract were really facts. See Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter on
Diversity and the Merits of Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Caveat to No. 221, at 106
(on file with author) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Diversity and the Merits] (“By suggesting to the
lower courts that these questions should be treated as questions of fact apart from statutory
meaning, some of the ill effects of rejection of Holmes’ views in Kansas City Title can be
minimized.”). Two scholars do seem to have concluded, however, that construction of the
contract presented a federal issue. See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 145; Jeffery L. Norton,
Note, Removal Doctrine Reaffirmed: Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 70 C ORNELL L. REV. 557, 564 (1985).
44 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672–74 (discussing only Phillips’ claim for coercive relief).
45 See id. at 672.
46 See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1106 n.81 (“Scholars have long recognized
that
intellectual property and insurance are areas particularly amenable to declaratory judgments.”);
see also Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 552 n.100 (giving the example
of an action for a judgment of non-liability on a debt as a salutary use of the declaratory option).
47 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544 (noting the method of
jurisdictional analysis taken by the Court in Skelly).
48 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 469–70
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal courts should not hear cases where
parties lack diversity and where the likelihood of a federal issue arising in the case is remote
at best); Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)
(dismissing an action in equity in federal court for lack of ripeness); cf. Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins.
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intended Skelly to mean what exactly it has often been taken to
mean—that a federal court may hear a request for declaratory relief
if and only if the party seeking such relief also has a valid claim for
coercive relief that would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, or
at least would come close to having such a claim.49 In fact, he wrote
an article while still a professor in which he took aim at the very idea
of anticipatory litigation, at least in the constitutional context,
arguing that, “[e]very tendency to deal with . . . [constitutional issues]
abstractedly, to formulate them in terms of sterile legal questions, is
bound to result in sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”50 As
Professor Purcell observes, although this article was “[o]stensibly” a
criticism of advisory opinions, in function it was a criticism of
declaratory judgments, arising from a fear that conservatives would
use this option to defeat progressive legislation.51 In making this
Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139–40 (1941) (refusing to construe the Anti-Injunction Act to allow a federal
court to enjoin re-litigation of an action previously tried to judgment in federal court); R.R.
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (requiring a stay of an action in equity
in order to allow state courts to resolve a disputed issue of state law); see generally MELVIN I.
UROFSKY , FELIX F RANKFURTER : JUDICIAL R ESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 33 (1991)
(describing Justice Frankfurter’s belief that, at least with respect to state experimentation,
federal judges should exercise judicial restraint and allow states to figure out new social and
economic policies for themselves).
49 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544. A literal application of
this principle would render the Declaratory Judgment Act a nullity, because anyone who
possessed a claim for coercive relief that satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule would have
access to federal court by virtue of that claim, and therefore would not need the act. See, e.g.,
Illinois ex rel. Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 543 n.63.
Such an
interpretation would also repudiate Aetna, in which the Court upheld the statute against
constitutional attack. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). Justice
Frankfurter was not a member of the Court at the time of Haworth, and perhaps he sought to
overrule that decision sub silentio. On the other hand, one could reasonably interpret Skelly
to say that a party seeking federal declaratory relief may only have access to federal court if that
party could also seek coercive relief, but for failing to satisfy some prerequisite unique to that
form of relief, such as not being able to demonstrate irreparable harm in support of a request
for an injunction. See, e.g., Field, supra note 6, at 624 (“Skelly Oil does not reveal whether the
‘coercive action that would have been brought’ can include actions that could not yet be
brought.”); cf. Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1135–36 (“[I]t is hard to define the stage in the
lifecycle of a dispute when only the declaratory judgment is available. . . . The beginning of this
stage is marked out by the strictures of Article III, . . . [i]ts end is marked by the availability of
the injunction . . . .”).
50 Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 H ARV . L. R EV . 1002, 1003 (1924).
Justice Frankfurter went on to write: “The reports are strewn with wrecks of legislation
considered in vacuo and torn out of the context of life which evoked the legislation and alone
made it intelligible.” Id.; see also Samuel Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV . 1275,
1299 (2010) [hereinafter Bray, Preventative Adjudication] (“[T]here would be enormous
administrative costs and error costs from a system that generated legally binding answers to
any question a person might ask . . . .”). Professors Doernberg and Mushlin also discuss this
article by Justice Frankfurter in their piece on Skelly and Franchise Tax Board. See Doernberg
& Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 571 n.190.
51 See E DWARD A. P URCELL , J R ., B RANDEIS AND THE P ROGRESSIVE C ONSTITUTION : E RIE ,
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argument, of course, Justice Frankfurter might have overlooked a
possible distinction between two different kinds of mirror-image
cases: those in which the party seeking declaratory relief has a
distinct underlying claim for coercive relief, such as an action for
breach of contract, and those in which the party seeking declaratory
relief seeks only to prevent someone else from bringing an adverse
claim.52 In the latter context, as Professor Harrison has argued, the
plaintiff’s cause of action can be seen as entirely derivative of the
defendant’s, in the sense that the one would not exist without the
other.53 But this distinction may have been too gossamer to affect
Justice Frankfurter’s position. With a little imagination, after all, a
suit to restrain another suit can be analogized to an action in equity
to restrain a trespass or an action for malicious prosecution.54
THE J UDICIAL P OWER , AND THE P OLITICS OF THE F EDERAL C OURTS IN
CENTURY AMERICA 127 (2000) (“Frankfurter argued that all procedural

T WENTIETH devices that
accelerated judgment served primarily to strengthen the power of the judiciary over the
legislature and to restrict the possibilities of intelligent social legislation.”); see also Frankfurter,
supra note 50, at 1005 (“[C]oncrete cases under the Due Process Clause are decided not by
taking anything out of the Constitution but by putting Adam Smith into it.”). Justice
Frankfurter was not alone in seeing a threat to progressive legislation in declaratory opinions.
See P URCELL, J R., supra, at 128–29 (“Brandeis’s opinion [in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Association] . . . was directed not to courts or lawyers or constitutional theorists but to the
Senate, where the declaratory judgment bill was literally on the verge of passage.” Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274 (1928)).
52 See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.44 (3d ed. 2016)
(discussing the unique facets of the Skelly case).
53 See Harrison, supra note 41, at 1001 (“[T]he nominal plaintiffs [in Ex parte Young] wanted
nothing more from the State than to be let alone; in more formal legal terms, they sought to
assert a defense, not a claim for affirmative relief.”); see also Robert Brauneis, The First
Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation
Law, 52 VAND. L. REV . 57, 122 (1999) (“[C]onstitutional liability in excess of common law
liability coexists with the justification-stripping model . . . of Ex parte Young.”); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM . L. REV. 489, 524 n.124 (1954)
(“[T]he personal wrong complained of [in Ex parte Young] consisted of threats of a multiplicity
of prosecutions, a very dubious tort under state law.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1479 n.218 (1987) (“Young itself, for example, involved no
individual private law tort by the defendant . . . .”).
54 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 153 (1908) (raising this issue); Collins, supra note 16,
at 1514 (“[A]lthough a common law cause of action in Young was not immediately apparent, the
Court considered the enforcement of confiscatory rate schedules in state court to be akin to
trespass.”); David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. S URV.
AM. L. 69, 86 (2011) (“The Court’s language [in Young] speaks not in terms of the prospective
defendant bringing suit to assert an anticipated defense to an enforcement action but rather of
the plaintiff’s objective of preventing a constitutional wrong analogous to a traditional trespass
on, or seizure of, the plaintiff’s property.”); Sina Kian, Note, Pleading Sovereign Immunity: The
Doctrinal Underpinnings of Hans v. Louisiana and Ex Parte Young, 61 STAN . L. REV. 1233,
1275 (2009) (“[The] rate structure [in Young] was arguably unconstitutional—and if it was, then
the rates enforced by officers were trespassory and, thus, created a cause of action against those
officers.”); but cf. Shapiro, supra, at 77 (suggesting that tangible property was not at stake in
Young and that courts had yet to recognize the tort of malicious prosecution fully by 1908).
Even today, the exact nature of the cause of action in a case like Young is not entirely clear.
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Professors Doernberg and Mushlin may therefore be correct when
they argue that under Skelly, “the sole type of declaratory judgment
case qualifying for federal question jurisdiction is one in which the
plaintiff would have had a coercive claim presenting a federal
question.”55
To be sure, Skelly contains language that supports such a reading.
“[A] suggestion of one party,” wrote Justice Frankfurter, “that the
other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, does not make the suit one arising under that
Constitution or those laws.”56 Although “claim” could refer simply to
a defense, such use of that word would be unconventional, at least to
modern ears.
On the other hand, this language appears toward the end of a long
paragraph in which Justice Frankfurter devotes all of his attention
to federal defense or federal reply cases, not mirror-image cases.57
Moreover, he took these words from Tennessee v. Union & Planters’
Bank, which itself was a federal-defense case.58 In that case, the
state went to federal court to collect a tax from certain banks that
objected that the tax impaired an obligation of contract.59 The banks
thus had a federal defense to the state’s coercive action under state
law,60 but they themselves had no federal cause of action, as would
be required in a mirror-image situation.61 In fact, even Professors
Doernberg and Mushlin acknowledge that Justice Frankfurter may
have accepted the mirror-image case as a beneficiary of the act.62 As
they point out, Skelly includes a citation to a note that approved
See Shapiro, supra, at 82 (“I am far from clear that Young must be regarded as establishing the
existence of a federal cause of action to enjoin wrongful conduct by a government official . . . .”
(emphasis added)). Only two terms ago, the Court rejected the description of such a case as a
direct action on the Supremacy Clause. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015).
55 Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548.
56 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) (quoting Tennessee v.
Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894)).
57 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672.
58 See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464.
59 See id. at 464–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 464 (majority opinion).
61 See id. at 464–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As noted earlier, however, parties subject to
state or local regulations that arguably violate federal law usually may bring an action in equity
or for declaratory relief to preclude application of that regulation to their conduct. See
discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text. In the case of a tax, however, the Tax
Injunction Act might preclude access to federal court independent of the well-pleaded complaint
rule and its progeny. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). It should be borne in mind, however, that
the bank was actually the defendant in Union & Planters’ Bank, and that the state itself had
sought a federal forum for the litigation. See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464–65
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
62 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 571 n.190.
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federal jurisdiction over mirror-image cases.63 “The problem we
address[,]” the professors write, “may be the interpretation of Skelly
by others afterwards, not Skelly itself.”64
The evidence is therefore inconclusive as to whether Justice
Frankfurter himself meant to exclude mirror-image cases from
federal court in Skelly. In an important sense, however, allowing a
mirror-image case into federal court only “expands” federal
jurisdiction in a temporal way,65 and therefore might not have
offended Justice Frankfurter’s jurisdictional sensibilities, at least
outside the context of an anticipatory constitutional attack on
legislation.66 That is, accepting such an action merely allows a
federal court to hear a case at the instance of the conventional
defendant in a coercive federal action, rather than requiring the court
to wait until the conventional plaintiff elects to sue.67 Whether the
court waits or not, the abstract power of the court to hear the case is
the same. To be sure, allowing federal courts to hear mirror-image
cases eliminates the conventional plaintiff’s ability to control access
to federal courts, which does relax one control on federal
jurisdiction.68 Thus, whether allowing mirror-image cases into
See id. at 571 n.190.
Id. Their primary thesis, however, appears to be that Justice Frankfurter intended to
exclude mirror-image cases from the federal courts. See id. at 548.
65 See id. at 571–72.
66 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. Justice Frankfurter also may not have
foreseen the federalist reaction to the trajectory of Ex parte Young at the close of the 1960s.
Under Younger, for example, federal courts will not ordinarily enjoin criminal prosecutions
pending in state court. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4041 (1971). In addition, although
such courts are willing to grant declaratory relief to people who have a ripe case but who are
not in fact being prosecuted, the Court has emphasized the ultimately discretionary nature of
such relief, noting the presence of the word “may” in the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007); Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (“Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been
understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether
to declare the rights of litigants.”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974); see also Wm.
Grayson Lambert, Unmixing the Mess: Resolving the Circuit Split Over the Brillhart/Wilton
Doctrine and Mixed Complaints, 64 KAN. L. REV. 793, 80809 (2016) (discussing this notion of
discretion in the context of a particular line of cases).
67 See generally Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 564 (offering an
example of a mirror-image federal question action).
68 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544.
The ability of the
conventional defendant to bring an anticipatory action for declaratory relief can also affect the
location of the litigation. See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of
Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1067
(2012) (“[M]any declaratory judgment actions are filed by accused infringers to control the forum
and timing of suit because they can secure a significant advantage when the cases go to trial.”);
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box,
99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000). Judge Moore has also found that juries are less likely to
uphold patents when a putative infringer brings an action for declaratory relief than when a
putative patentee brings an action for infringement. See Moore, supra, at 368. Of course,
63
64
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federal court “expands” federal jurisdiction is largely a matter of
perception. If one sees accelerated access (at the instance of a
conventional defendant) as an “expansion” of jurisdiction, then
current members of the United States Supreme Court are incorrect
when they describe the effect of the Declaratory Judgment Act as
“procedural only.”69 If, by contrast, one sees such access as merely a
temporal adjustment, then these descriptions are accurate.70 As
several scholars have observed, anticipatory litigation can yield
efficient results.71
But whether or not mirror-image cases “expand” federal
jurisdiction, the fact remains that the Court has refused to allow
federal courts to hear a sub-category of such cases exemplified by the
oft-maligned Franchise Tax Board v. Constructive Laborers Vacation
Trust. Analyzing this case will go a long way toward determining the
current operative effect of Skelly.
II. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD REDUX
Franchise Tax Board began as an action in state court by
California’s equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service, the
Franchise Tax Board (“Board”).72 The complaint had two counts. The
first count was a coercive action, a claim for current and future money
owed.73 According to the Board, the Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust (“Trust”) was holding assets on behalf of certain people who
were delinquent in their taxes, and the Trust had a duty to render
those assets to the Board to satisfy those delinquencies.74 The second
count was an action under California’s Declaratory Judgment Act for
limiting access to declaratory relief might not materially reduce strategic behavior. For
example, someone accused of infringing a patent who seeks to avoid the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit might choose to sue the putative infringee for antitrust,
provoking a counterclaim for infringement, appeal for which (from a federal district court) would
lie in a regional circuit rather than the Federal Circuit because of Holmes. S e e Holmes Grp.,
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 827–30 (2002); C. Scott Hemphill,
Deciding Who Decides Intellectual Property Appeals, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 380 (2009). In
Holmes, the Court held that the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from cases
in which the complaint lacked a claim of patent infringement, even if the counterclaim in such
cases includes such a claim. See Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 830.
69 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
70 See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1134.
71 See, e.g., Bray, Preventative Adjudication, supra note 50, at 1278 (“[T]here are two
categories of cases in which discounting is pervasively inadequate and preventive adjudication
is therefore necessary: uncertainty about legal status, and ‘clouded’ ownership of property.”);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 683, 690−92 (1994).
72 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 5 (1983).
73 See id. at 5−7.
74 See id.
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a declaration that the Trust had to submit to similar levies from the
Board in the future, notwithstanding the Trust’s apparent position
that federal law forbade it from doing so.75 After the Board brought
its action in state court, the Trust removed.76
A unanimous Court, per Justice Brennan, held that federal
jurisdiction was not proper.77 Justice Brennan made short work of
the first count.78 Its elements were simple and lacked a federal issue,
he said.79 Simply, the Court found that the Trust owed the Board
money under the laws of California, and that the Trust had refused
to submit to the Board’s levy.80 To be sure, the Trust may have had
an affirmative defense under federal law, but such a defense was
irrelevant under the well-pleaded complaint rule.81
The second count was a little more complicated. As an initial
matter, Justice Brennan had to explain why Skelly applied, even
though the Board had asked for relief under California’s Declaratory
Judgment Act, not the federal one.82 The Court sensibly concluded
that Skelly’s purposes would be undermined if it were not applied to
a state declaratory action removed to federal court.83 In fact, Skelly
made even more sense here than in its original context, because here
the plaintiff had chosen state court and was resisting federal
jurisdiction.84
Justice Brennan then had to apply Skelly.85 That is, he had to
hypothesize a complaint for coercive relief that underlay the Board’s
But this complaint was only
request for a declaration.86
“hypothetical” in a nominal sense, because the Board had pleaded it
as its first count—its coercive action for current and future money

75 See id. Arguably, the Board could have sought only coercive relief and relied on stare
decisis to support similar actions in the future. See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1121. As
noted above, every judicial award of relief relies on some supporting legal principle, which
constitutes a “declaration” of the rights and duties of the parties, however denominated. See
supra note 20.
76 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 7.
77 See id. at 7.
78 See id. at 13−14.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 18.
83 See id. at 18–19. To complete the analytical loop for Justice Brennan, if the Court did not
apply Skelly to an action under state law for declaratory relief, a future Phillips could simply
include a count along those lines in its complaint against a future Skelly and bring the action
in federal court.
84 See id. at 7.
85 See id. at 19–21.
86 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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owed.87
Because this coercive action failed the well-pleaded
complaint rule, Skelly appeared to preclude federal jurisdiction.88
But this preliminary conclusion was complicated by the presence
of an apparently coercive action in the Trust.89 Section 502(a)(3) of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)
appears to authorize parties like the trustees to bring an action in
equity in federal court to clarify their rights and duties under the
statute.90 Franchise Tax Board thus appeared to present an issue
that Justice Frankfurter had left unresolved in Skelly—whether a
federal court may hear a case where the party seeking declaratory
relief lacks an underlying action for coercive relief that satisfies the
well-pleaded complaint rule, but the party against whom the
declaration is sought possesses such an action.91 Thus, if Justice
Frankfurter meant to construe the federal Declaratory Judgment Act
to preclude mirror-image cases in Skelly, the effect of his work would
not be felt until a case like Franchise Tax Board.
Further complicating this analysis was the fact that, by the time of
Franchise Tax Board, lower federal courts were routinely
entertaining mirror-image cases under the act, even though the
Court itself had never addressed such a case.92 To his credit, Justice
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5–7.
See id. at 13–14.
89 I say “apparently” because the Trust’s action bore many of the characteristics of an action
for declaratory relief. This may have been, but probably was not, a factor in the Court’s analysis.
See discussion infra notes 174–80.
90 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan[.]”); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 (noting that the trustees would have qualified as
“fiduciar[ies]” under this language). Whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) in fact would have
authorized the trustees to bring an action in equity to clarify their duties vis-à-vis the Board is
not entirely clear, even though Justice Brennan seemed to assume as much in Franchise Tax
Board. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20 n.21. Although section 502(a)(3) authorizes
parties like the trustees to seek equitable relief, it does not refer specifically to “clarification” or
“rights,” whereas a nearby paragraph in the same sub-section, section 502(a)(1), actually does
use such words, or at least their cognates. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (“A civil action may
be brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan[.]”). A conventional application of the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius might therefore suggest that parties like the Trust could not use
section 502(a)(3) to seek clarification of their rights and duties under ERISA. The Court has
struggled somewhat with the proper scope of relief under section 502(a)(3). See infra notes 178–
80 and accompanying text. Apart from the foregoing complications, there is also the wrinkle
that the Tax Injunction Act might have prevented the trustees from attacking the Board’s levy
in federal court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 20 n.21.
91 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19.
92 See, e.g., infra note 93.
87
88
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Brennan acknowledged this trend, noting in the text of the opinion
that federal courts “regularly” heard such cases,93 and noting in a
footnote that such “courts ha[d] consistently adjudicated suits by
alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the theory
that an infringement suit by the declaratory judgment defendant
would raise a federal question over which the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction.”94
What was the Court to do? On the one hand, Skelly stood for the
proposition that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act is “procedural
only” and does not enlarge the scope of federal jurisdiction.95
Moreover, in Franchise Tax Board, a state was seeking to enforce its
own rights in its own courts as a plaintiff, implicating strong
federalist concerns.96 On the other hand, letting federal courts
entertain requests for declaratory relief in the mirror-image situation
arguably does not “enlarge” federal jurisdiction—it merely
accelerates it—and lower federal courts were routinely allowing such
actions to proceed.97 In addition, Congress had a strong reason to
want federal courts to establish a uniform set of rules governing the
rights and duties of such entities as the Trust.98
The doctrinally uncomplicated answer would have been to allow
the federal courts to entertain the dispute. This would have been
consistent with the trajectory of cases in the lower courts that Justice
Brennan had acknowledged, and it would have eliminated any
lingering uncertainty about whether the Declaratory Judgment Act
authorizes federal courts to hear cases in the mirror-image context.99
But here yet another complicating factor must be introduced into
the analysis. Even where the well-pleaded complaint rule is
satisfied, as it arguably is (in an oblique sense) in the mirror-image
context, federal courts will still ask if the federal issue is
“substantial” enough to merit federal judicial attention.100 If not,
93 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 (“Federal courts have regularly taken original
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant
brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal
question.”).
94 Id. at 19 n.19 (citing E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.
1937)).
95 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (quoting Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)).
96 See generally Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 (“Appellant Franchise Tax Board is a
California agency charged with enforcement of that [s]tate’s personal income tax law . . . [and
it] filed a complaint in state court . . . .”).
97 See id. at 19.
98 See id. at 19–21.
99 See id. at 19–20.
100 See id. at 13.
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they will reject the case, even though it literally satisfies the rule.101
The word “substantial” here is something of a term of art, however.
The true—but not particularly useful—test is whether, all things
considered, federal jurisdiction is appropriate.102 As Justice Brennan
explained in Franchise Tax Board, the statutory concept of “[‘arising
under’] has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition
for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside,
the original jurisdiction of the district courts.”103
An early example of this principle in action is Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Co.104 In this case, Moore brought two counts
invoking three statutory actions against the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co. (“C&O”) in federal court, alleging that he had sustained
injuries because of a “defective uncoupling lever” in the C&O’s yards
in Russell, Kentucky.105 The first count was for violation of the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the federal Safety Appliance
Acts, which combined governed injuries in interstate commerce, and
the second was for violation of the Employers’ Liability Act of
Kentucky, which governed injuries in intrastate commerce.106
Although the second count arose under the law of Kentucky, the state
had by legislation provided that violation of a federal standard
relating to equipment—here, arising from the federal Safety
Appliance Acts—constituted negligence per se for purposes of
liability.107 Thus, an allegation that the defective lever violated
See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936).
See id. Use of the word “substantial” in this context appears to have originated with
Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Court in Gully. See id. (“To define broadly and in the abstract
‘a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States’ . . . there has been a selective
process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.”).
103 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8. Justice Brennan may have come to regret the breadth
of this observation. Three years after Franchise Tax Board, in the case of Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court addressed a situation in which a complaint literally satisfied
the well-pleaded complaint rule, but the majority deemed the federal issue embedded therein
too insubstantial to justify federal jurisdiction—a conclusion perfectly consistent with Justice
Brennan’s description of this area of the law as cryptic in Franchise Tax Board. See Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816–17 (1986). Justice Brennan himself dissented
in Merrell Dow, however, arguing that satisfying the well-pleaded complaint rule should be both
necessary and sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction. See id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]f one makes the test sufficiently vague and general, virtually any set of results
can be ‘reconciled.’” (citation omitted)).
104 Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
105 See id. at 207–08.
106 See id. at 208.
107 See id. at 213 (“As in the analogous case under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, a
violation of [e.g., the federal Safety Appliance Acts] . . . was to constitute negligence per se in
applying the state statute and was to furnish the ground for precluding the defense of
contributory negligence as well as that of assumption of risk.”). This observation by the Court
suggests—but does not conclusively establish—that Moore’s case might not have satisfied the
well-pleaded complaint rule. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101
102
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federal law was arguably a formal part of his case-in-chief.108
Nevertheless, the Court, per Chief Justice Hughes, held that federal
jurisdiction was not available on this second count.109 Although the
Court provided relatively little analysis in support of this conclusion,
subsequent treatment of the case has settled on the explanation that
the mere embedding of a federal standard in an ordinary action for
negligence under the law of a state does not suffice to make a case
“arise under” the laws of the United States, even it literally satisfies
the well-pleaded complaint rule.110
Another decision in this vein—although it post-dates Franchise
Tax Board by three years—is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson.
In this case, Thompson sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (“Merrell Dow”) in Ohio state court on a variety of
state theories, including negligence and product liability.111 One of
Thompson’s theories was that Merrell Dow had breached a duty by
failing to disclose certain side-effects of one of its medications as
required by a federal statute, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”).112 Thus, much like Moore, Thompson embedded a federal
issue—whether Merrell Dow had violated a federal standard of
disclosure—in an otherwise ordinary complaint under the laws of
Ohio.113 On this ground, Merrell Dow attempted to remove the case
to federal court.114 And, just as in Moore, the Court rejected federal
jurisdiction.115 Although Thompson’s action literally satisfied the
well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court, per Justice Stevens, deemed
the embedded federal issue “insufficiently ‘substantial’” to merit the
federal judiciary’s attention.116
Unlike in Moore, however, the Court in Merrell Dow provided a
fairly fulsome explanation of why the federal courts could not hear
That is, if the C&O’s failure to provide a proper decoupling lever as per the federal Safety
Appliance Acts simply precluded a defense of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk,
a federal issue would not have presented itself in the case until the third round of pleading.
Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his dissent in the Merrell Dow case. See generally
id. (explaining federal jurisdiction).
108 See Moore, 291 U.S. at 208.
109 See id. at 217.
110 See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12; see generally Cohen, supra note 43, at 911
(“[A] case does not arise under federal law if federal law merely provides a standard of conduct
which affects a state-law-based negligence action.”).
111 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
112 See id. at 805–06.
113 See id. at 809–10 (quoting Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
114 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806.
115 See id. at 817.
116 See id. at 814. Justice Brennan dissented, describing Moore “as having been a ‘sport’”
from the moment it was decided. Id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the case. In particular, it put enormous weight on the fact that
Congress did not appear to have vested Thompson with a private
right of action to sue Merrell Dow under the federal statute.117
Justice Stevens inferred from the absence of such a right of action
that Congress would not have wanted Thompson’s analogous claim
under the law of Ohio to proceed in federal court.118
Although one might disagree with Moore and Merrell Dow, the two
cases are fairly strong evidence that satisfaction of the well-pleaded
complaint rule, although necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction
under statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is not sufficient to do so. To be
sure, Merrell Dow came after Franchise Tax Board, and therefore
could not have served as precedent to the earlier case.119 But not so
for Moore.120 Thus, there was precedent at the time of Franchise Tax
Board that would permit Justice Brennan to reject federal
jurisdiction in that case, even though the party against whom a
declaration had been sought—the Trust—had a coercive action in its
back pocket that would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.121 In
other words, there was precedent under which Justice Brennan could
conclude that the Trust’s action, although literally satisfying the rule,
was insufficiently “substantial,” with all the word entails, to justify
federal jurisdiction.122
The next wrinkle that arises, however, is that the Trust’s
hypothetical action looked about as “substantial” (from a federal
perspective) as an action could possibly look. Far from being a state
action with an embedded federal issue, as in Moore or Merrell Dow,
the Trust in Franchise Tax Board had a fairly explicit federal action
under ERISA.123 Thus, it satisfied the old, strict test for federal
jurisdiction of American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.124
Under this test, a case “arises under” the laws of the United States if
and only if the United States supplies the plaintiff’s cause of action.125
Under modern doctrine, a case need not satisfy American Well Works

117 See id. at 810–11 (majority opinion). To be precise, the Court simply assumed that the
federal statute did not confer a private right of action, and plaintiff and defendant agreed on
this point. See id. at 810.
118 See id. at 812, 817.
119 See id. at 804; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 1 (1983).
120 See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 205 (1934).
121 See id. at 217.
122 See id.; see generally Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (using the language “insufficiently
substantial” when holding that the presence of a claimed violation of a federal statute in a cause
of action may not necessarily confer federal jurisdiction).
123 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
124 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
125 See id. at 260 (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”).
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to lie in federal court, but satisfaction of this test is considered a
virtual guarantee that federal jurisdiction will be available.126 In
other words, satisfaction of American Well Works is almost invariably
sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction, even if it is not necessary,
much as satisfaction of the well-pleaded complaint rule is necessary
to do so, although not sufficient.
In fact, the only case that jurists and scholars can typically identify
in which the test eventually established in American Well Works was
satisfied, but federal jurisdiction was still held not to be available, is
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter.127 This case arose from a dispute over
a federal patent to a mining claim.128 A federal statute authorized
miners to obtain such patents by “staking a claim,” which was then
held up to sixty days, during which time rivals could submit adverse
claims.129 If such a claim was received, a related provision of federal
law stayed issuance of the patent “until the controversy shall have
been settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .”130
This same provision also required the rival “to commence proceedings
in a court of competent jurisdiction, [and] to determine the question
of the right of possession . . .” within thirty days of submitting the
adverse claim.131 The Court held that federal jurisdiction was not
available, and many have construed Shoshone Mining as a rare—or
even solitary—counter-example to American Well Works.132 Mining
126 See Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9 (“[I]t is well settled that Justice Holmes’ test is
more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts’
original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction.”);
see also Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary International Law,
106 A.J.I.L. 531, 535–36 (2012) (“Since the general federal question statute is narrower in scope
than the ‘arising under’ clause of Article III, any suit that satisfies the Holmes test necessarily
falls within the scope of Article III.”).
127 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); see, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Of Rules
and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J.
309, 343 (2007) (stating that the leading exception to the American Well Works test is Shoshone
Mining).
128 See Shoshone Mining Co., 177 U.S. at 506, 511–12; see also Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841
n.63 (stating that Shoshone Mining was a case dealing with competing claims of title to mineral
rights originally conveyed by federal deed or patent).
129 See Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 6, 17 Stat. 91, 92 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §
29 (2012)). I am indebted to Professor Oakley for his diligence in uncovering the statute at
issue in Shoshone Mining. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63.
130 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 7, 17 Stat. 91, 93 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 30).
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5
(2005) (“For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right of action, see
[Shoshone Mining].” (citation omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 43, at 902 (describing
Shoshone Mining as an oft-cited case that presents an exception); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan
Horse, supra note 14, at 535 n.29 (“The Court later announced [in American Well Works] that
the law creating the cause of action was the law under which the action arose, but it did so
without disapproving Shoshone [Mining].”).
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the statutes quoted above, however, Professor Oakley has
persuasively argued that Congress simply provided that applications
for federal patents could be held up while rivals pursued adverse
claims in a “court of competent jurisdiction.”133 According to this
view, the cause of action at issue in Shoshone Mining was not federal,
and therefore American Well Works was not satisfied.134 If he is
correct, Shoshone Mining was excluded from federal court on much
the same ground as Moore and Merrell Dow—for lack of a
“substantial” federal issue, even though that issue might have
appeared on the face of the well-pleaded complaint.135 But history
belongs largely to those who write it, and courts and scholars have
often described Shoshone Mining as a lone or rare counter-example
to American Well Works.136 As Professor Oakley demonstrates, it
may not be,137 but—oddly enough—Franchise Tax Board may take
its place.
As may be recalled, the Trust in Franchise Tax Board had a cause
of action that was itself a creature of federal law.138 If the Trust had
brought suit against the Board under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, its
action would have satisfied American Well Works and federal
jurisdiction would have been clear, provided of course that the Trust
had a ripe case.139 As may also be recalled, however, the Trust did
not bring this action, but instead waited for the Board to commence
suit.140 Thus, the Trust was the defendant in the Board’s request for
declaratory relief.141
Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63.
See id.
135 See id. at 1839.
136 See, e.g., Freer, supra note 127, at 343 (stating that the leading exception to the American
Well Works test is Shoshone Mining); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory
Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1527 n.185 (1991) (noting
that the Court has recognized Shoshone Mining as an exception to the American Well Works
test).
137 See Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63.
138 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1983).
139 As noted earlier, this action would have resembled a request for declaratory relief in the
sense that the Trust would have sought nothing more than a determination that it had no duty
to submit to the Board’s levy. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, one must
establish some acute need for such a determination before one may obtain the attention of a
court. In Franchise Tax Board, the Trust arguably could have shown this by pointing to an
extensive correspondence between itself and the Board over the Trust’s duties to submit to the
Board’s levies. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 n.4 (describing the back and forth
correspondence between the Board and the Trust). A judge might reasonably have inferred
from the Board’s posture during this correspondence that the Board was on the verge of
bringing a coercive action against the Trust, which suit under section 502(a)(3) would have
forestalled. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012); supra note 90 and accompanying text.
140 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5.
141 See id.
133
134
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If the mirror-image rule applied, however, the Trust’s status as the
“declaratory judgment defendant” should have made no difference.
As Justice Brennan himself noted in Franchise Tax Board, alleged
infringers of patents routinely obtain federal declaratory relief
against putative infringees, thus predicating federal jurisdiction on a
reversal of roles—precisely what the mirror-image rule
contemplates.142 As noted earlier, straight-forward adherence to this
trajectory would have yielded a decision sustaining federal
jurisdiction.143 But a unanimous Court went the other way.144 “There
are good reasons,” wrote Justice Brennan, “why the federal courts
should not entertain suits by the States to declare the validity of their
regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law.”145 According to
him, the Board’s request for declaratory relief was “sufficiently
removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation” that
underlay such decisions as Skelly Oil to preclude federal jurisdiction,
absent some congressional indication to the contrary.146
This conclusion could easily be seen as bizarre by those who expect
universal adherence to the mirror-image rule, which incorporates
American Well Works. Professors Doernberg and Mushlin, for
example, describe this aspect of Franchise Tax Board as
“intellectually unsupportable.”147 Similarly, Professor Segall asks:
“What federal values could th[e] ‘race to the courthouse’ rule
[ordained by Franchise Tax Board] possibly serve?”148
These are fair objections. In fact, Franchise Tax Board is a worthy
target for scholars who decry Skelly in the first place, or who could do
without the well-pleaded complaint rule itself. Most famously, this
includes Professor Doernberg, who has written that Skelly, “though
requiring . . . a bit of mental gymnastics,” was “workable” until
Franchise Tax Board.149 With Franchise Tax Board, however,
Skelly’s “true problems and another absurdity resulting from
adherence to the Mottley rule became manifest.”150 The American
See id. at 19 n.19.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
144 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28.
145 Id. at 21.
146 Id. at 21–22.
147 Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 545.
148 Segall, supra note 7, at 502–03. In saying this, Professor Segall is emphasizing the fact
that federal jurisdiction would have been proper if the Trust had brought an action against the
Board under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, instead of waiting for the Board to initiate suit.
149 Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason For It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes Federal Questions Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597,
642 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It].
150 Id. In a series of articles, some of which he has co-written with his colleague Professor
Mushlin, Professor Doernberg has argued that the well-pleaded complaint rule defies
142
143
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Law Institute has also recommended that Congress amend the
federal judicial code to permit removal on the basis of a federal
defense.151
But if one accepts the possibility that even cases that satisfy
American Well Works might—on rare occasions—fail to present a
“substantial” federal question, then Franchise Tax Board can be
reconciled with other cases, much like Shoshone Mining has been. As
Professor Cohen famously argued, the “practical reasons” for denying
federal jurisdiction in Shoshone Mining were “overwhelming.”152
Many of the cases, he wrote, would turn on idiosyncratic local
congressional intent, not only by misconstruing various statutes of the late nineteenth century,
but also by misconstruing the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. See id. at 601–07 (late
nineteenth-century statutes); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 547–49
(Declaratory Judgment Act). As a consequence, he would allow federal courts to hear cases in
all three of the categories we have been discussing—federal-defense cases, federal-reply cases,
and mirror-image cases. See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 531–33,
548–49. And he would do so in the presence of, or in the absence of, the act. See Doernberg,
There’s No Reason for It, supra note 149, at 662. As a matter of legislative history, Professor
Doernberg makes a fairly strong case that Congress did not intend what is now 28 U.S.C. §
1331 to include the well-pleaded complaint rule. See id. at 601–07. In fact, between 1875,
when Congress first enacted what is now § 1331, and 1887, when it amended that statute, the
Court would often consult a defendant’s answer to determine if federal jurisdiction was proper
on removal. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10 n.9.
On the other hand, as Justice
Brennan himself observed in Franchise Tax Board, the well-pleaded complaint rule—as
adapted by Skelly to actions for declaratory relief—has now become so entrenched in federal
law that only Congress could displace it. See id. at 18 n.17 (“At this point, any adjustment in
the system that has evolved under the Skelly Oil rule must come from Congress.”). Moreover,
it is now a fairly well-established canon of statutory jurisdiction that the Court requires clear
statements from Congress before it will apply general statutes in ways that significantly alter
the federalist balance. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (requiring a clear statement by Congress to
overcome a presumption against preemption of state law); see also Ernest A. Young, Federal
Courts: Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1607–08 (2000) (“[P]rocess federalism has significant potential as a viable
means of enforcing significant constraints on federal power.”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004) (discussing situations in which the Court
can draw the line between valid and invalid federal actions). Although the well-pleaded
complaint rule is not an explicit part of § 1331 or any similar statute, it prevents federal courts
from hearing a significant number of cases that arise under state law. See Doernberg, There’s
No Reason for It, supra note 149, at 662. Construing § 1331 not to include the rule would
therefore dramatically affect the allocation of cases between state and federal court. See
generally id. at 663 (describing this shift as potentially salutary for “overburdened state
systems”). Most particularly, it would allow federal jurisdiction over many actions in tort where
the defendant has a federal defense of preemption. Given the scope of the federal regulatory
state, there are many contexts in which such a defense will be available. This is not to say that
Congress should not allow federal jurisdiction in such situations, but only that the legislature
should decide.
151 See STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1311 (AM. LAW
INST. 1969); see also Field, supra note 6, at 616–17 (noting that, prior to Mottley, courts would
consider all pleadings to be relevant in terms of invoking federal question jurisdiction, not just
the complaint).
152 Cohen, supra note 43, at 906.
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customs, resolution of which would not require a federal judge’s
expertise, and allowing such cases into federal courts in the Old West
might have overwhelmed such tribunals.153 The question thus
presents itself—can similar logic explain Franchise Tax Board?
Perhaps, but the case is hard to make. We can begin by
remembering that the Trust’s coercive action—the action that the
Board sought to anticipate—satisfied American Well Works, which is
generally recognized as a virtual guarantee that a case “arises under”
the laws of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
analogous statutes.154 As noted above, conventional wisdom teaches
that only one case, Shoshone Mining, satisfied American Well Works
yet failed to qualify for federal jurisdiction,155 and even that
characterization is subject to valid criticism.156 This alone suggests
that the Court reached a conclusion in error in Franchise Tax Board.
Other considerations point in the same direction. Consider, for
example, the federal interest in proper resolution of the case. At
stake in Franchise Tax Board was the duty under federal law of the
trustees of a plan governed by ERISA to submit to a levy upon
beneficiaries of the plan by a state.157 Although the constitutionality
of a federal statute was not in play,158 one could easily suppose that
Congress would want a federal forum for an issue of the sort
presented in Franchise Tax Board.159 Witness Congress’ creation of
an express cause of action in the trustees under the statute. Witness
as well that suits by fiduciaries under section 502(a) of ERISA lay
exclusively in federal court and would be governed by a body of
federal common law.160 The aggregate of the foregoing considerations
leads many—if not all—scholars in the area of federal jurisdiction to
find Franchise Tax Board mystifying.161
So what rationale can possibly account for Franchise Tax Board?
We can begin by remembering that the opinion was unanimous,162
which means not a single member of the Court argued for federal
See id. at 906–07.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
157 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1983).
158 Cf., e.g., Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195, 199, 200 (1921) (allowing
federal jurisdiction over an action under the law of Missouri where the crux of the case was the
constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing the sale of certain bonds).
159 See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 131.
160 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24 n.26.
161 See, e.g., P ETER W. L OW ET AL., F EDERAL C OURTS AND THE L AW OF F EDERAL -S TATE
RELATIONS 6 0 8 (8th ed. 2014) (“Say again?”) (responding to the holding in Franchise Tax
Board).
162 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 3.
153
154
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jurisdiction.163 Although judges do on occasion misapprehend the
law, they tend not to do so en masse.164 At the very least, therefore,
there must be a prudential explanation for the case.
Such an explanation is arguably hidden in plain sight. An
instrumentality of a state had pled a case under its own laws, in its
own courts, after Congress had apparently authorized the object of
the state’s interest to seek relief in federal court, if and only if it took
the initiative. A high regard for federalism, a desire to reward
initiative, and even perhaps a desire to punish sloth, all tend to
explain the result in Franchise Tax Board.165 Of course, as Robin
Dieckmann points out, a state that took the initiative and wanted
federal jurisdiction over a case like Franchise Tax Board would also
be shunted to state court,166 a result that she plausibly criticizes.167
A possible response to her argument is that states do not often try
this sort of thing, that they have access to their own courts, and that
Congress could certainly authorize federal jurisdiction over such
actions if it so chose.168
We should also note here that Justice Frankfurter’s private
papers169 indicate that he probably would have supported the result
in Franchise Tax Board. In more than one early draft of Skelly, he
decried the possibility that entities like the Board could take
advantage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act to enforce their
levies in federal court if they anticipated a federal defense (and if
See id. at 28.
See generally Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 915–16, 924 (1989)
(arguing that judges may lack expertise in particular areas of the law and may make errors,
but that those errors do not go unchecked by other judges or the system as a whole).
165 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21 n.22 (“[C]onsiderations of comity make us reluctant
to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule
demands it.”); Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 154 n.177 (accounting for Franchise Tax Board in
this manner); Norton, supra note 43, at 569 (“[Franchise Tax Board is] an exception to the
Skelly Oil rule . . . [created out of] deference to state governments . . . .”); see generally Field,
supra note 6, at 630 (“If the rationale [of Franchise Tax Board] was limited to cases brought by
states, it is too bad that was not well explained and did not even appear in the body of the
opinion.”).
166 See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 168, 171.
167 See id. at 159 (“Contrary to Franchise Tax Board, federal question jurisdiction should be
broad enough to include suits in which a state seeks a declaratory judgment that federal law
does not preempt a state law.”).
168 The well-pleaded complaint rule and its various permutations are not driven by the
Constitution. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494−95 (1983)
(citations omitted).
169 Frankfurter, Diversity and the Merits, supra note 43; Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter
on Jurisdiction in Skelly Oil Case, Other than on Basis of Diversity (on file with author)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Jurisdiction Memorandum]; Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter,
Untitled (on file with author) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Untitled Memorandum].
163
164
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Phillips’ construction of the statute were to prevail):
This is not a bit of mere formalism. To sanction a suit for
declaration merely because a defense is anticipated or made
on the strength of a federal law will turn into the federal
courts a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under
State law in the sense that the right to be vindicated was State
created. Thus the enforcement of State tax laws and of the
extensive range of State regulatory measures could be
brought in, or removed to, the federal courts in the frequent
instances when it may be anticipated or is claimed that the
asserted State-created right is invalidated by limitations
imposed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States
upon the States in creating such rights.170
The fact that Justice Frankfurter ultimately deleted this language
from Skelly may suggest that he thought better of it. On the other
hand, his general hostility to federal jurisdiction is well known, and
this language reflects that hostility.171 Moreover, although he did
delete this language, he retained his citation to Tennessee v. Union &
Planters’ Bank, which corresponded precisely to what he had
deleted.172 In Union & Planters’ Bank, a state brought an action in
federal court against a bank to collect a tax, predicting that the bank
would raise a federal defense.173 Retention of this citation suggests
that Justice Frankfurter was not repudiating the language he
deleted. But gauging Justice Frankfurter’s likely approach to
Franchise Tax Board is complicated by the existence of the Trust’s
action under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.174 Had he been aware of
such an action, he might have approved federal jurisdiction over a
mirror-image case. In short, there is no clean resolution of these
issues.
This brings us to the question of whether there is a universal
principle that one can derive from the case. One can begin by
supposing that mirror-image cases are cognizable in federal court
under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act if and only if the party

170 Frankfurter, Jurisdiction Memorandum, supra note 169, at 104−05; see also Frankfurter,
Untitled Memorandum, supra note 169, at 112 (“[O]n the theory of the present suit against
Skelly and Stanolind, litigation of State tax laws . . . could be had in the federal courts in the
frequent instances when it may be anticipated or explained that the asserted State-created
right is invalidated by [some federal limitation] . . . .”).
171 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
172 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672–73 (1950) (quoting
Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 462, 464 (1894)).
173 See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464.
174 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983).
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seeking declaratory relief is not a state or an instrumentality thereof.
As noted above, a high regard for federalism, a desire to reward
initiative, and a desire to punish sloth all support allowing a case to
remain in state court if a state chooses a state forum for declaratory
relief and Congress has authorized the counter-party to avail itself of
a federal forum.175 Similar considerations would cut sharply in the
opposition direction in the common situation where a putative
infringer of a patent brings an action for declaratory relief in federal
court against a putative infringee. In that situation, although the
putative infringer is neither a state nor an instrumentality thereof,
and although Congress has given the putative infringee an express
right of action against the putative infringer, at least the putative
infringer has taken the initiative to sue in federal court.176 This
combination of factors would explain the disparate results in
Franchise Tax Board and cases like E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A
Specialty Co.177
Another possible explanation for Franchise Tax Board lies in the
oddly declaratory nature of section 502(a) of ERISA. Although this
provision uses the language of injunctive relief, authorizing a
“fiduciary” (such as the trustees) to sue “to enjoin any act or practice”
that violates ERISA, or “to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief . . . to redress such violations . . . [,]”178 an “injunction”
forbidding the Board from imposing a levy on the Trust would not
have been dramatically different from a declaration to the same
effect. To be sure, the threat of contempt would lie behind it, but
such an injunction—if granted—would presumably have the same
immediate effect as a declaration.179 Perhaps the Franchise Tax
Board Court was afraid of walking into a hall of mirrors, where an
ostensibly coercive, but functionally declaratory, federal cause of
action sustained federal jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in the
mirror-image context.180
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F. Supp. 784, 785 (E.D. Va. 1997).
177 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 2728; E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co.,
88 F.2d 852, 85354 (7th Cir. 1937). In fact, Justice Brennan cited E. Edelmann & Co. with
approval in Franchise Tax Board. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 n.19.
178 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
179 See, e.g., Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1123 (“[I]n many cases in which a plaintiff seeks
prospective relief, a declaratory judgment and an injunction are interchangeable.”).
180 The speculation here is that the Court might have seen the Board’s second count and the
Trust’s action under section 502(a)(3) as opposing requests for declaratory relief, with nary a
request for coercive relief in sight (other than the Board’s first count, which would fail the wellpleaded complaint rule). In their article on declaratory judgments, Professors Doernberg and
Mushlin take the opposite tack, suggesting not only that the Trust’s action can be seen as
coercive, but also that it can be seen as a distinct original action, such that the Board’s action
175
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This may be. But ultimately I am disinclined to draw this inference
from Franchise Tax Board, for two reasons. First, the statute
literally uses the language of equity.181 Second, the Board and the
Trust had had an exchange of papers, and the Board was presumably
asserting its position with increasing vigor.182 At some point, “saberrattling,” so to speak, can satisfy the criteria for equitable relief.183
In the context of intellectual property, for example, a sufficiently
clear threat to seek immediate relief for alleged infringement can
justify injunctive relief.184 The facts of Franchise Tax Board would
appear to satisfy a comparable test under section 502(a)(3).185
CONCLUSION
Like the Infield Fly Rule,186 the well-pleaded complaint rule can be
an object of scholarly and juristic fascination. But it also has
practical implications for a vast array of actual or potential federal
litigants. Although Skelly and Franchise Tax Board may be lovely
chestnuts for scholars in the area of federal jurisdiction, evaluating
their scope and their merits can serve useful purposes. As I hope I
could be seen as defensive in nature. See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14,
at 545 n.71. This is plausible, but it would require some imagination to visualize. If the money
to which the Board laid claim were seen as being already in its constructive possession, and the
Board were trying to prevent the Trust from “seizing” that money under section 502(a)(3), the
Board’s action could in turn be seen as defensive in nature. In other words, with some
imagination, the Board’s action could be analogized to an action in equity to restrain a trespass.
See id. The arguably simpler way to visualize the matter is that the Trust’s action under
section 502(a)(3) was not distinct, but instead derivative of the Board’s action, such that the
latter would not exist without the former.
181 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
182 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 n.4.
183 See, e.g., Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 113536.
184 See, e.g., id. at 1135–36. A similar practice is in place for actions to quiet title.
See, e.g.,
Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314, 322 (1894) (“At common law a party might by successive
fictitious demises bring as many actions of ejectment as he chose, and a bill to quiet title was
only permitted for the purpose of preventing the party in possession being annoyed by repeated
and vexatious actions. The jurisdiction was in fact only another exercise of the familiar power
of a court of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits by bills of peace.”).
185 To be sure, the Court itself has not settled on a liquidated determination of the scope of
available relief under section 502(a)(3). In Mertens, it held that relief under this provision was
limited “to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and restitution . . .).” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
Presumably an order forbidding the Board from imposing a levy on the Trust would qualify
under this test, but the validity of this conclusion might depend upon how the Court conducted
its historical analysis. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68
V AND. L. REV . 997, 1016 (2015) (“Equity has a long history, and in that history many conflicting
things have been said about it. It was once said, for example, that equity would never enjoin a
trespass.”).
186 Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. P A . L. R EV . 1474, 147475
(1975).

53 SALAMANCA PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)

2016/2017]

Skelly Oil and Franchise Tax Board

81

have demonstrated, Skelly retains an enormous influence on our
jurisprudence, often as a precedent that can be worked around, but
often as well as a precedent that can bar access to federal court.

